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Abstract
This paper introduces the notion of cache-tapping into the information theoretic models of coded
caching. In particular, the wiretap II channel model in the presence of multiple receivers equipped with
fixed-size cache memories, and an adversary who is able to choose symbols to tap into from cache
placement, in addition to or in lieu of, delivery transmission, is introduced. The model is hence termed
the caching broadcast channel with a wire and cache tapping adversary of type II. The legitimate parties
know neither whether cache placement, delivery, or both phases are tapped, nor the positions in which
they are tapped. Only the size of the overall tapped set is known. For the instance of two receivers and
two library files, the strong secrecy capacity of the model, i.e., the maximum achievable file rate while
keeping the overall library strongly secure, is identified. Lower and upper bounds on the achievable
strong secrecy file rate are derived when the library has more than two files. Achievability schemes in
this paper rely on a code design which combines wiretap coding, security embedding codes, one-time
pad keys, and coded caching. A genie-aided upper bound, in which a genie provides the transmitter with
user demands before cache placement, establishes the converse for the two files instance. For the library
of more than two files, the upper bound is constructed by three successive channel transformations. Our
results establish that strong information theoretic security is possible against a powerful adversary who
optimizes its attack over both phases of communication in a cache-aided system.
This work was supported by NSF Grant CNS 13-14719.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Caching is proposed to efficiently reduce network traffic congestion by storing partial contents
at the cache memories of end users earlier during off-peak times, providing local caching gain
[1]–[3]. More recently, reference [4] has shown that a careful design of cache contents at the
end users in a multi-receiver setting allows the transmitter to send delivery transmissions that are
simultaneously useful for many users, providing a global caching gain. This gain depends on
the aggregate cache memory of the network and demonstrates the ability of coding over delivery
transmission and/or cache contents to offset lack of cooperation between the receivers.
In numerous works to date, coded caching has been studied under various modeling assump-
tions and for various network configurations, including online, decentralized, hierarchical caching
[5]–[8], non-uniform demands [9], more users than files [10], [11], heterogeneous cache sizes
[12], [13], improved bounds [14]–[16], interference networks [17]–[19], combination networks
[20], [21], device-to-device communication [22], [23], and broadcast channels [24]–[27].
Coded caching with confidentiality requirements has recently been studied in references [21],
[28]–[33]. These references assume secure cache placement, i.e., the adversary cannot tap into
the cache contents or into the communication which performs the cache placement. At the other
extreme, if cache placement were to be public, i.e., the adversary were to have perfect access
to the cache contents, it follows in a straightforward fashion from [34], [35] that the presence
of cache memories cannot increase the secrecy capacity. Given the results of these two extreme
settings, this paper considers an intermediate scenario in which the adversary may have partial
access to cache placement.
The wiretap channel II, introduced in [36], provides a model for an adversary who has partial
access to the legitimate communication, in the form of a threshold on the time fraction during
which the adversary is capable of tapping into the communication. In particular, the model
considers a noiseless legitimate channel and an adversary who chooses a fixed-size subset of the
transmitted symbols to noiselessly observe. Reference [36] showed that, despite this ability to
choose the wiretapped symbols, with proper coding, this adversary can be made no more powerful
than nature, i.e., the secrecy capacity of the wiretap II model is identical to that of a binary
erasure wiretapper channel with the same fraction of erasures. Reference [37] has generalized
the wiretap II model to one with a discrete memoryless, i.e., noisy, legitimate channel, and
3derived inner and outer bounds for its capacity-equivocation region. The secrecy capacity for
this model was identified in [38]. Reference [39] has introduced a generalized wiretap model
which subsumes both the classical wiretap [40] and wiretap II [37] models as special cases. This
generalized model was extended to multi-transmitter and multi-receiver networks in [41]–[43].
In all these models, the common theme is the robustness of stochastic wiretap encoding [40]
against a type II adversary who is allowed to choose where to tap.
In this paper, we consider an adversary model of type II as in [36]–[39], [41]–[43], but in
a cache-aided communication setting. In particular, the adversary noiselessly observes a partial
subset of its choosing of the transmitted symbols over the cache placement and/or delivery
phases. Thus we term this model the caching broadcast channel with a wire and cache tapping
adversary of type II (CBC-WCT II). The legitimate parties do not know whether the cache
placement, delivery, or both transmissions are tapped, the relative fractions of tapped symbols in
each, or their positions. Only the knowledge of the overall size of the tapped set by the adversary
is available to the legitimate terminals.
The challenge in caching stems from the fact that the transmitter, who has access to a
library of files, has no knowledge about the future demands of end users when designing their
cache contents. This remains to be the case when security against an external adversary is
concerned. Additionally, for the adversary model in consideration, the adversary might tap into
cache placement, delivery, or both, and where the tapping occurs is unknown to the legitimate
parties. We show that even under these unfavorable conditions, strong secrecy guarantees can
be provided that are invariant to the positions of the tapped symbols varying between cache
placement, delivery, or both.
In coded caching literature up to date, the physical communication which populates the cache
memories at end users does not need to be considered in the problem formulation, due to
the assumption of secure cache placement. By contrast, in order to model cache placement
that is tapped by an adversary, we consider a length-n communication block over a two-user
broadcast wiretap II channel [42]. The sizes of cache memories at the receivers are fixed in this
model. We note that introducing variable memory sizes for which a rate-memory tradeoff can be
characterized, as in the usual setup for caching, requires considering additional communication
blocks for cache placement. Being of future interest, we comment on this extension to multiple
4communication blocks for cache placement in the Discussion section, Section VII. We as well
provide reasoning for our choice of the broadcast setting for cache placement.
In summary, the contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
1) We introduce the notion of cache-tapping into the information theoretic models of coded
caching, in which an adversary of type II is able to tap into a fixed-size subset of symbols
of its choosing either from cache placement, delivery, or both transmissions.
2) We characterize the strong secrecy capacity of the model, i.e., the maximum achievable
file rate which keeps the overall library strongly secure, for the instance of a transmitter’s
library with two files:
• We devise an achievability scheme which integrates wiretap coding [36], security em-
bedding codes [44], [45], one-time pad keys [34], coded cache placement and uncoded
delivery [4].
• We utilize a genie-aided upper bound, in which a genie provides the transmitter with
user demands before cache placement, rendering the model to a two-user broadcast
wiretap II channel [42], in order to establish the converse for this case.
3) We derive lower and upper bounds on the strong secrecy file rate when the transmitter’s
library has more than two files:
• We utilize a coding scheme that is similar to the scheme we used for two files. However,
the cache placement and delivery schemes we employ to achieve the rates differ from
those utilized for two files. In particular, we utilize here uncoded cache placement and
a partially coded delivery.
• We derive the upper bound in three steps. First, we consider a transformed channel
with an adversary who can tap an equal fraction of symbols to our model, but is
only allowed to tap into the delivery phase. Since this adversary has a more restricted
strategy space than the original one, the corresponding secrecy capacity is at least as
large as our original model. Next, we utilize Sanov’s theorem in method of types [46,
Theorem 11.4.1] to further upper bound the secrecy capacity for the restricted adversary
model by the secrecy capacity when the adversary encounters a discrete memoryless
binary erasure channel. Finally, the secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless model
is upper bounded by the secrecy capacity of a single receiver setting in which the
5Fig. 1: The caching broadcast channel with a wire and cache tapping adversary of type II (CBC-
WCT II). The adversary chooses tapping sets S1 and S2 in placement and delivery.
receiver requests two files from the library.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the communication
system proposed in this paper. Section III presents the main results. The proofs for these
results are provided in Sections IV, V, and VI. Section VII provides a discussion about the
communication model in question and the presented results. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We first remark the notation we utilize throughout the paper. N, Z, and R denote the sets of
natural, integer, and real numbers, respectively. For a, b ∈ R, [a : b] denotes the set of integers
{i ∈ N : a ≤ i ≤ b}. We use A[1:n] to denote the sequence of variables {A1, A2, · · · , An}. For
two sets A1 and A2, A1×A2 denotes their Cartesian product. A
T denotes the T -fold Cartesian
product of the set A. For W1,W2 ∈ [1 : M ], W1 ⊕W2 denotes the bit-wise XOR on the binary
bit strings that correspond to W1, W2. We use 1A to denote the indicator function for the event
A. D(px||qx) denotes the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the probability distributions px,
qx, defined on the same probability space. {ǫn}n≥1 denotes a sequence of positive real numbers
such that ǫn → 0 as n→∞.
6Consider the communication system depicted in Fig. 1, in which the adversary has the ability
to tap into both the cache placement and delivery transmissions. The transmitter observes D ≥ 2
independent messages (files), W1,W2, · · · ,WD, each of which is uniformly distributed over
[1 : 2nRs]. Each receiver has a cache memory of size n
2
bits. The communication occurs over
two phases: placement and delivery. The broadcast channel is noiseless during both phases. The
communication model is described as follows:
Cache placement phase: During this phase, the transmitter broadcasts a length-n binary signal,
X
n
c ∈ {0, 1}
n, to both receivers. The codeword Xnc is a function of the library files, i.e., X
n
c ,
fc
(
W[1:D]
)
. The transmitter does not know the receiver demands during cache placement [4].
Each receiver has a cache memory of size n
2
bits in which they store a function of Xnc , Mc,j ,
fc,j(X
n
c ), where fc,j : {0, 1}
n 7→ [1 : 2
n
2 ] and j = 1, 2.
Delivery phase: At the beginning of the delivery phase, the two receivers announce their
demands d , (d1, d2) ∈ [1 : D]
2 to the transmitter. The transmitter, in order to satisfy the receiver
demands, encodes W[1:D] and d into the binary codeword X
n
d
∈ {0, 1}n. In particular, for each
d, the transmitter uses the encoder fd : [1 : 2
nRs]D 7→ {0, 1}n and sends Xn
d
, fd
(
W[1:D]
)
.
Decoding: Receiver j utilizes the decoder gd,j : [1 : 2
n
2 ] × {0, 1}n 7→ [1 : 2nRs], in order to
output the estimate Wˆdj , gd,j (fc,j(X
n
c ),X
n
d
) of its desired message Wdj , where j = 1, 2.
Adversary model: The adversary chooses two subsets S1, S2 ⊆ [1 : n]. The size of the sum
of cardinalities of S1 and S2 is fixed. That is, for |S1| = µ1, |S2| = µ2, µ1, µ2 ≤ n, we have
µ1 + µ2 = µ. The subsets S1 and S2 indicate the positions tapped by the adversary during the
cache placement and delivery phases, respectively. Over the two phases, the adversary observes
the length-2n sequence Z2nS = [Z
n
S1
,ZnS2 ] ∈ Z
2n; ZnSj , [ZSj ,1, ZSj ,2, · · · , ZSj ,n] ∈ Z
n, j = 1, 2,
ZS1,i =


Xc,i, i ∈ S1
?, i /∈ S1
, and ZS2,i =


Xd,i, i ∈ S2
?, i /∈ S2.
(1)
The alphabet is Z = {0, 1, ?}, where “?” denotes an erasure.
The legitimate terminals know neither the realizations of S1 and S2, nor the values of µ1 and
µ2. Only µ is known. Let us define α1 =
µ1
n
and α2 =
µ2
n
as the fractions of the tapped symbols
in the cache placement and delivery phases, and let α = α1 + α2 be the overall tapped ratio.
7Notice that α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1] and α ∈ (0, 2].
Remark 1 We consider that α is strictly greater than zero, i.e., the adversary is present. For
α = 0, i.e., no adversary, the problem considered in this paper has been extensively studied in
the literature, see for example [4], [47]–[49]. 
A channel code C2n for this model consists of
• D message sets; Wl , [1 : 2
nRs ], l = 1, 2, · · · , D,
• Cache encoder; fc : [1 : 2
nRs]D 7→ {0, 1}n,
• Cache decoders; fc,j : {0, 1}
n 7→ [1 : 2
n
2 ], j = 1, 2,
• Delivery encoders; {fd : d ∈ [1 : D]
2}, fd : [1 : 2
nRs]D 7→ {0, 1}n,
• Decoders; {gd,j : j = 1, 2, d ∈ [1 : D]
2}, gd,j : [1 : 2
n
2 ]× {0, 1}n 7→ [1 : 2nRs].
The file rate Rs is said to be achievable with strong secrecy if there exists a sequence of
channel codes {C2n}n≥1 satisfying
lim
n→∞
max
d∈[1:D]2
P
( ⋃
j=1,2
(Wˆdj 6= Wdj )
)
= 0, (2)
and lim
n→∞
max
S1,S2⊆[1:n]:
|S1|+|S2|≤µ
I
(
W[1:D];Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
= 0. (3)
That is, Rs is the symmetric secure file rate, under any demand vector and adversarial strategy.
The strong secrecy capacity Cs is the the supremum of all achievable Rs.
Remark 2 While we consider the file rate Rs which guarantees reliability for the worst-case
demand vector, the average rate for which there exists a prior distribution on the demands has
been studied in coded caching literature as well; see for example [9], [14], [50]. 
Remark 3 The condition in (3) guarantees strong secrecy against all possible strategies for the
adversary, i.e., choices of the subsets S1 and S2 which satisfy the condition |S1|+ |S2| ≤ µ. 
III. MAIN RESULTS
For clarity of exposition, we first study the model described in Section II when the transmitter
has two files in its library, i.e., D = 2. We then extend the ideas and the analysis to the case of
a library with more than two files, i.e., D > 2. For D > 2, we utilize a channel coding scheme
8that is similar to the scheme we construct for D = 2, but the cache placement and delivery
schemes that achieve the best rates are different from those used for D = 2.
The following theorem presents the strong secrecy capacity for D = 2.
Theorem 1 For 0 < α ≤ 2 and D = 2, the strong secrecy capacity for the caching broadcast
channel with a wire and cache tapping adversary of type II (CBC-WCT II), described in Section
II, is given by
Cs(α) = 1−
α
2
. (4)
Proof: The proof is provided in Section IV. 
Theorem 2 below presents an achievable strong secrecy file rate for D > 2.
Theorem 2 For 0 < α ≤ 2 and D > 2, the achievable strong secrecy file rate for the CBC-WCT
II is
Rs(α) ≥


1
2
+ 3(1−α)
4D
, 0 < α < 1
1− α
2
, 1 ≤ α ≤ 2.
(5)
Proof: The proof is provided in Section V. 
The following theorem upper bounds the secure file rate when D > 2.
Theorem 3 For 0 < α ≤ 2 and D > 2, the achievable strong secrecy file rate for the CBC-WCT
II is upper bounded as
Rs(α) ≤


1
2
+ 2D−1
2D(D−1)
(1− α), 0 < α < 1
1− α
2
, 1 ≤ α ≤ 2.
(6)
Proof: The proof is provided in Section VI. 
The following corollary is immediate from Theorems 1, 2, and 3.
Corollary 1 For 1 ≤ α ≤ 2, that is when the adversary can tap longer than one phase of
communication, the strong secrecy capacity for the CBC-WCT II is
Cs(α) = 1−
α
2
. (7)
9Fig. 2: Bounds on the achievable strong secrecy file rate Rs, when α = 0.4 and D ≥ 3.
Remark 4 When α ∈ [1, 2], i.e., n ≤ µ ≤ 2n, two possible strategies for the adversary are
{S1 = [1 : n], S2 ⊂ [1 : n]} or {S1 ⊂ [1 : n], S2 = [1 : n]}. That is, the adversary can tap into all
symbols in one phase and a subset of symbols in the other phase. Interestingly, a positive strong
secrecy capacity is achievable against such an adversary. We elaborate more on the intuition
behind this result in the Discussion section. 
Unlike for 1 ≤ α ≤ 2, for 0 < α < 1, the lower and upper bounds in (5) and (6) have a gap.
For illustration purposes, these bounds are plotted for α = 0.4 in Fig. 2.
Remark 5 When α = 0, i.e., no adversary, our achievability scheme for D > 2 described in
Section V reduces to the achievability scheme in [4], which is shown to achieve the optimal
rate-memory tradeoff for the case of two users and a library size of three or larger [47], [49].
The upper bound for D > 2 derived in this work is to address the intricacies of the adversarial
model and is useful only when the adversary is present (α > 0), i.e., (6) is loose when α = 0.

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IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we prove Theorem 1, which identifies the strong secrecy capacity for the model
in Section II when D = 2. Recall that the demand vector is denoted by d = (d1, d2), where
d1, d2 ∈ {1, 2}.
A. Converse
For the model in Theorem 1, when the demand vector d is known to the transmitter dur-
ing cache placement, the model reduces to a broadcast wiretap channel II, over a length-2n
communication block. The strong sum secrecy rate for that model, 2Rs, is upper bounded by
2Rs ≤ 2− α, (8)
which follows from our recent work [42, Theorem 1]. Notice that (8) holds for any d = (d1, d2)
such that d1 6= d2, which represents the worst-case demands. Since the demand vector is unknown
for the model in consideration, 1− α
2
is an upper bound for its strong secrecy capacity.
B. Restricted Adversary Models as Building Blocks
Before proceeding with the achievability proof, it is relevant to take a step back and investigate
the secrecy capacity when a known fraction of cache placement, a known fraction of delivery,
or both, is tapped. In particular, we consider that the adversary taps into (i) cache placement
only, (ii) delivery only, or (iii) both and the relative fractions of tapped symbols in each are
known. For these three models, we show that the strong secrecy file rate in (4), i.e., 1 − α
2
, is
achievable, and hence determines their strong secrecy capacities. We then use these models as
building blocks for when the relative fractions are unknown, and provide the achievability proof
in Sections IV-C and IV-D.
1) Setting 1: The adversary taps into cache placement only:
Let α1 = α (α2 = 0), and |S1| = µ (S2 = ∅). That is, the adversary taps into cache placement
only. Consider that the transmitter and the receivers know that α1 = α. We show that 1−
α
2
is
an achievable strong secrecy file rate for this setting.
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The transmitter divides the message Wl, l = 1, 2, into three independent messages, W
(1)
l ,
W
(2)
l , and Wl,s, where W
(1)
l , W
(2)
l , are uniform over
[
1 : 2n
1−α−ǫn
2
]
, and Wl,s is uniform over[
1 : 2n
α+ǫn
2
]
. Define
Mc = {Mc,1,Mc,2} ; Mc,1 = W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 , Mc,2 =W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 , (9)
Md =
{
W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
,Wd1,s,Wd2,s
}
. (10)
During cache placement, the transmitter maps Mc into X
n
c using stochastic encoding, i.e.,
wiretap coding [40]. Since the rate of Mc is less than 1 − α, Mc is strongly secure from the
adversary who observes nα symbols of Xnc [38], [39]. During the delivery phase, the transmitter
sends Xn
d
as the binary representation of Md which is of length n bits, since the delivery phase
is noiseless and secure.
Using Xnc , noiselessly received during cache placement, receiver j, j = 1, 2, recovers Mc,j
and stores it in its cache memory. Notice that the size of Mc,j , for j = 1, 2, is smaller than
n
2
bits, i.e., the cache size at each receiver. Using Xn
d
, received noiselessly during delivery, both
receivers perfectly recover Md. Using Md along with its cache contents, i.e., Mc,j , and for n
sufficiently large1, receiver j correctly recovers its desired message Wdj , j = 1, 2.
For secrecy, we show in Appendix A that (3), which reduces to
lim
n→∞
max
S1⊆[1:n]: |S1|=µ
I(W1,W2;Z
n
S1
) = 0, (11)
is satisfied. Since ǫn → 0 as n→∞, the achievable strong secrecy file rate is given by
Rs(α) = 2×
1− α
2
+
α
2
= 1−
α
2
. (12)
2) Setting 2: The adversary taps into the delivery only:
This setting corresponds to α1 = 0 and α2 = α, and the transmitter and receivers possess this
knowledge. Once again, we show that 1− α
2
is an achievable strong secrecy file rate.
The transmitter performs the same division of Wl, l = 1, 2, as in Setting 1. In addition, the
transmitter generates the keys K1, K2, each is uniform over
[
1 : 2n
α+ǫn
2
]
, independent from one
1Large block-length n is needed in order to ensure a valid subpacketization of the fileWl into the sub-files {W
(1)
l ,W
(2)
l ,Wl,s},
for l = 1, 2. That is, a bijective map between the file and its sub-files is preserved.
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another and from W1, W2. In this case, we define Mc, Md, and M˜d, as follows.
Mc = {Mc,1,Mc,2} ; Mc,1 =
{
W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 , K1
}
, Mc,2 =
{
W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 , K2
}
, (13)
Md =
{
W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
}
, (14)
M˜d = {Wd1,s ⊕K1,Wd2,s ⊕K2} . (15)
During cache placement, the transmitter sends Xnc as the binary representation of Mc, and
receiver j, j = 1, 2, stores Mc,j in its cache memory. During delivery, the transmitter encodes
Md into X
n
d
using wiretap coding, while using M˜d as the randomization message. Receiver j
recovers Md and M˜d, using which, along with Mc,j , it correctly decodes Wdj , for sufficiently
large n. By contrast, the adversary can only retrieve M˜d using which it can gain no information
about W1 and W2. We show in Appendix B that (3), i.e.,
lim
n→∞
max
S2⊆[1:n]: |S2|=µ
I(W1,W2;Z
n
S2) = 0, (16)
is satisfied. The achievable strong secrecy file rate is again 1− α
2
.
3) Setting 3: The legitimate terminals know the values of α1 and α2:
For this setting, neither α1 = 0 nor α2 = 0. However, the transmitter and receivers know the
values of α1 and α2. Under these assumptions, the scheme which achieves the strong secrecy
rate of 1 − α
2
depends on whether α1 ≥ α2. For α1 ≥ α2, we utilize an achievability scheme
similar to Setting 1; for α1 < α2, we utilize an achievability scheme similar to Setting 2.
Case 1: α1 ≥ α2: The transmitter divides Wl, l = 1, 2, into the independent messages{
W
(1)
l ,W
(2)
l ,Wl,s
}
; W
(1)
l ,W
(2)
l are uniform over
[
1 : 2n
1−α1−ǫn
2
]
and Wl,s is uniform over[
1 : 2n
α1−α2
2
]
. The transmitter forms Mc and Md as in (9) and (10), and uses wiretap coding to
map them into Xnc and X
n
d
, respectively. As in setting 1, receiver j correctly decodes Wdj .
For the secrecy constraint, notice thatMc andMd are independent, and their rates are 1−α1−ǫn
and 1 − α2 − ǫn, respectively. Thus, wiretap coding strongly secures both Mc and Md against
the adversary. We show in Appendix C that (3) is satisfied. The achievable strong secrecy file
rate is
Rs(α) = 2×
1− α1
2
+
α1 − α2
2
=
2− α1 − α2
2
= 1−
α
2
. (17)
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Case 2: α1 < α2: The transmitter (i) dividesWl, l = 1, 2, into
{
W
(1)
l ,W
(2)
l ,Wl,s
}
;W
(1)
l ,W
(2)
l
are uniform over
[
1 : 2n
1−α2−ǫn
2
]
and Wl,s is uniform over
[
1 : 2n
α2−α1
2
]
, (ii) generates the keys
K1, K2, uniform over
[
1 : 2n
α2−α1
2
]
, independently from W1,W2, (iii) forms Mc as in (13) and
encodes it into Xnc using wiretap coding, (iv) forms Md as in (14) and forms M˜d as
M˜d =
{
Wd1,s ⊕K1,Wd2,s ⊕K2, W˜
}
, (18)
where W˜ is independent from all other variables and uniform over
[
1 : 2n(α1+ǫn)
]
, and (v) encodes
Md into X
n
d
using wiretap coding, while using M˜d as the randomization message.
As in Setting 2, for n sufficiently large, receiver j, j = 1, 2, correctly decodes Wdj , and
the adversary can only retrieve M˜d using which it can gain no information about W1, W2. In
Appendix D, we show that (3) is satisfied. The achievable secrecy rate is
Rs(α) = 2×
1− α2
2
+
α2 − α1
2
= 1−
α
2
. (19)
With the aforementioned settings, we showed that the same secrecy rate, i.e., 1 − α
2
, is
achievable irrespective of where the adversary taps as long as α1 and α2 are known. The question
then arises whether the lack of knowledge about relative fractions of tapped symbols would
decrease the secrecy capacity. The following setting we propose provides a hint on the answer.
4) Setting 4: Either α1 = 0 or α2 = 0, the legitimate terminals do not know which is zero:
The adversary taps into either cache placement or delivery, but not both. The legitimate terminals
do not know which phase is tapped. We show that the strong secrecy rate 1−α
2
is again achievable.
The transmitter performs the same division of W1, W2 as in Settings 1, 2, and generates
independent keys K1, K2 as in Setting 2. Let us define
Mc = {Mc,1,Mc,2} ; Mc,1 = W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 , Mc,2 =W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 , (20)
M˜c = {K1, K2} , (21)
Md =
{
W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
}
, (22)
M˜d = {Wd1,s ⊕K1,Wd2,s ⊕K2} . (23)
During cache placement, the transmitter encodes Mc into X
n
c using wiretap coding, while
using M˜c as the randomization message. Receiver j, j = 1, 2, stores Mc,j , M˜c,j , in its cache
14
memory. During delivery, the transmitter uses wiretap coding to encode Md into X
n
d
, while
using M˜d as the randomization message. Using its cache contents, along with Md and M˜d,
receiver j correctly decodes Wdj . By contrast, the adversary can only retrieve either {K1, K2}
or {Wd1,s ⊕K1,Wd2,s ⊕K2}, but not both, using which it can obtain no information about W1
and W2. We show in Appendix E that (3) is satisfied. The achievable strong secrecy rate is 1−
α
2
.
The lack of knowledge about which phase is tapped is countered by encrypting pieces of
information, {Wd1,s,Wd2,s}, with one-time pad keysK1 andK2, while ensuring that the adversary
only retrieves either the keys or the encrypted bits but not both; using which it can gain no
information about the messages W1 and W2.
In the following subsection, we generalize this idea to tackle the case when the adversary gets
to tap into both phases, with no knowledge about the relative fractions of tapped symbols in
each, i.e., the model in Fig. 1. In particular, similar to [45], in which the uncertainty about the
wiretapper’s channel is treated by using a security embedding code [44], here, in each phase,
we construct an embedding code in which nα single-bit layers are embedded into one another.
Doing so, we ensure that, no matter what the values for α1 and α2 are, the adversary can retrieve
no more than nα1 bits from cache placement, and nα2 bits from delivery. By designing what
the adversary retrieves to be either a set of key bits and/or information bits encrypted with a
distinct set of key bits, we guarantee no information on the messages is asymptotically leaked
to the adversary. We thus prove that the lack of knowledge about relative fractions of tapped
symbols does not decrease the secrecy capacity.
C. Achievability for α ∈ (0, 1):
We are now ready to present the achievability for the general model considered in this paper.
Consider first α ∈ (0, 1). For simplicity, assume that nα1
2
= µ1
2
and nα2
2
= µ2
2
are integers. A
minor modification to the analysis can be adopted otherwise.
The transmitter divides Wl, l = 1, 2, into the independent messages W
(1)
l , W
(2)
l , Wl,s; W
(1)
l ,
W
(2)
l are uniform over
[
1 : 2n
1−α
2
]
, and Wl,s is uniform over
[
1 : 2n
α
2
]
. The transmitter gener-
ates the independent keys K1, K2, uniform over
[
1 : 2n
α
2
]
, and independent from W1,W2. For
simplicity of exposition, we have ignored the small rate reduction ǫn at this stage, as we will
introduce this later into the security analysis. The main ideas of the achievability proof are:
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1) The transmitter uses wiretap coding with a randomization message of size n(α1+α2) = nα
bits in both the cache placement and delivery phases. As the adversary does not tap into
more than nα bits in each phase, a secure transmission rate of 1− α is achievable in each
phase, as long as the randomization messages in the two phases are independent. Using
coded placement for W
(1)
1 , W
(2)
1 , W
(1)
2 , W
(2)
2 , a secure file rate of 1− α can be achieved.
2) The randomization messages over the two phases can deliver additional secure information,
of rate α
2
per file, via encryption. The overall achievable file rate is thus Rs = 1 −
α
2
. In
particular, we utilize the keys K1, K2, as the randomization message for cache placement.
Along with wiretap coding, we employ a security embedding code [44], by using bits of
K1, K2, in a manner that allows the adversary to be able to retrieve only the last n
α1
2
bits
from each. In the delivery phase, we encrypt additional pieces of information, Wd1,s and
Wd2,s, with the keys K1 and K2, and utilize this encrypted information as the randomization
message. We employ again a security embedding code, in the reverse order, such that the
adversary can only retrieve the first nα2
2
bits from each of Wd1,s ⊕K1 and Wd2,s ⊕K2.
3) With the aforementioned construction, the adversary, for any values of α1 and α2 it chooses,
can only retrieve a set of key bits and/or a set of information bits encrypted with other key
bits. In particular, due to the reversed embedding order, the adversary does not obtain,
in the delivery phase, any message bits encrypted with key bits it has seen during cache
placement. In addition, since {K1, K2} is independent from {Wd1,s ⊕K1,Wd2,s ⊕K2}, and
is an independent sequence, the adversary can not use the revealed key bits in the cache
placement to obtain any information about the bits of Wd1,s⊕K1 and Wd2,s⊕K2 that need
to be securely transmitted in the delivery phase.
We now explain the achievability scheme in more detail. Let us define Mc and M˜c as in (20)
and (21). In particular, let
Mc = {Mc,1,Mc,2} ; Mc,1 = W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 , Mc,2 =W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 , (24)
M˜c =
{
M˜c,1, M˜c,2
}
; M˜c,1 = K1, M˜c,2 = K2. (25)
Mc in (24) represents the message to be securely transmitted during cache placement, regardless
of the adversary’s choice of α1. M˜c in (25) represents the randomization message utilized for
wiretap coding in the cache placement.
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Fig. 3: Codebook construction for the cache placement phase, Cc,n.
The transmitter further divides M˜c,1 and M˜c,2 into sequences of independent binary bits,{
M˜
(1)
c,1 , M˜
(2)
c,1 , · · · , M˜
(nα2 )
c,1
}
and
{
M˜
(1)
c,2 , M˜
(2)
c,2 , · · · , M˜
(nα2 )
c,2
}
, and generates Xnc as follows:
Cache Placement Codebook Generation: Let mc, m˜c,1 =
{
m˜
(1)
c,1, m˜
(2)
c,1 , · · · , m˜
(nα2 )
c,1
}
, and
m˜c,2 =
{
m˜
(1)
c,2 , m˜
(2)
c,2, · · · , m˜
(nα2 )
c,2
}
be the realizations of Mc, M˜c,1, and M˜c,2 in (24) and (25).
We construct the cache placement codebook Cc,n, from which X
n
c is drawn, as follows. We
randomly and independently distribute all the possible 2n length-n binary sequences into 2n(1−α)
bins, indexed by mc ∈
[
1 : 2n
1−α
2
]2
. Each bin mc contains 2
nα binary sequences (codewords).
Further, we randomly and independently divide each bin mc into two sub-bins, indexed by m˜
(1)
c,1 ,
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and each contains 2nα−1 codewords. The two sub-bins m˜
(1)
c,1 are further divided into smaller bins,
indexed by m˜
(1)
c,2 , and each contains 2
nα−2 codewords. The process continues, going over m˜
(2)
c,1 ,
m˜
(2)
c,2 , · · · , m˜
(nα2−1)
c,1 , m˜
(nα2−1)
c,2 , m˜
(nα2 )
c,1 , until the remaining two codewords, after each sequence
of divisions, are indexed by m˜
(nα2 )
c,2 . The codebook Cc,n is described in Fig. 3.
Remark 6 An alternative representation of the binning procedure described above is that, each
of the 2nα binary codewords in the bin mc, where mc ∈
[
1 : 2n
1−α
2
]2
, is randomly assigned to
an index
{
m˜
(1)
c,1, m˜
(1)
c,2 , m˜
(2)
c,1, m˜
(2)
c,2 , · · · , m˜
(nα2 )
c,1 , m˜
(nα2 )
c,2
}
. We chose however to present the former
description in order to provide a more detailed explanation of the embedding structure; in
particular, the order of embedding, which is a critical component in the achievability scheme.

Cache Encoder: Given the messages w1, w2, i.e.,
{
w
(1)
1 , w
(2)
1 , w1,s
}
,
{
w
(1)
2 , w
(2)
2 , w2,s
}
, the
transmitter generates mc, m˜c = {m˜c,1, m˜c,2} as in (24), (25). Using the codebook Cc,n, the trans-
mitter sends xnc which corresponds tomc, m˜c,1, m˜c,2, i.e., x
n
c
(
mc, m˜
(1)
c,1, m˜
(1)
c,2 , · · · , m˜
(nα2 )
c,1 , m˜
(nα2 )
c,2
)
.
For the delivery phase, as in (22) and (23), define
Md =
{
W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
}
, (26)
M˜d =
{
M˜d,1, M˜d,2
}
; M˜d,1 = Wd1,s ⊕K1, M˜d,2 = Wd2,s ⊕K2. (27)
Md in (26) represents the message to be securely transmitted during the delivery phase no matter
what the adversary’s choice of α2 is. M˜d in (27) represents the randomization message utilized
for the wiretap coding in the delivery phase.
Similar to cache placement, the transmitter further divides M˜d,1, M˜d,2 into sequences of in-
dependent binary bits,
{
M˜
(1)
d,1, · · · , M˜
(nα2 )
d,1
}
,
{
M˜
(1)
d,2, · · · , M˜
(nα2 )
d,2
}
, and generates Xn
d
as follows.
Delivery Codebook Generation: Letmd, m˜d,1 =
{
m˜
(1)
d,1, · · · , m˜
(nα2 )
d,1
}
, m˜d,2 =
{
m˜
(1)
d,2, · · · , m˜
(nα2 )
d,2
}
be the realizations of Md, M˜d,1, M˜d,2 in (26), (27). We construct the delivery codebook Cd,n,
from which Xn
d
is drawn, in a similar fashion as the codebook Cc,n, but with a reversed indexing
of the sub-bins. In particular, we randomly and independently divide all the 2n binary sequences
into 2n(1−α) bins, indexed by md ∈
[
1 : 2n
1−α
2
]2
, and each contains 2nα codewords. We further
randomly and independently divide each bin md into two sub-bins, indexed by m˜
(nα2 )
d,1 , and each
contains 2nα−1 codewords. The process continues, going in reverse order over m˜
(nα2 )
d,2 , m˜
(nα2−1)
d,1 ,
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Fig. 4: Codebook construction for the delivery phase, Cd,n.
m˜
(nα2−1)
d,2 , · · · , m˜
(1)
d,1, until the remaining two codewords, after each sequence of divisions, are
indexed by m˜
(1)
d,2. The codebook Cd,n is described in Fig. 4.
Delivery Encoder: Given w1, w2, i.e.,
{
w
(1)
1 , w
(2)
1 , w1,s
}
,
{
w
(1)
2 , w
(2)
2 , w2,s
}
, and d = (d1, d2),
the transmitter generates md, m˜d = {m˜d,1, m˜d,2} as in (26), (27). The transmitter sends x
n
d
, from
Cd,n, which corresponds to md, m˜d,1, and m˜d,2, i.e., x
n
d
(
md, m˜
(nα2 )
d,1 , m˜
(nα2 )
d,2 , · · · , m˜
(1)
d,1, m˜
(1)
d,2
)
.
Decoding: Using Xnc , receiver j, j = 1, 2, recovers Mc,j , M˜c,j , and stores them in its cache
memory. For j = 1, 2, the combined size of Mc,j and M˜c,j does not exceed
n
2
bits. Using Xn
d
,
both receivers recover Md, M˜d. Using Md, M˜d, Mc,j , M˜c,j , and for n sufficiently large, receiver
j correctly decodes Wdj .
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Security Analysis: Let us first slightly modify the construction above as follows. Recall that
{ǫn}n≥1 is a sequence of positive real numbers such that ǫn → 0 as n→∞. Define
αǫ = α+ 2ǫn, α1,ǫ = α1 + ǫn, α2,ǫ = α2 + ǫn. (28)
That is, α1,ǫ + α2,ǫ = αǫ. We increase the sizes of K1 and K2 into
nαǫ
2
bits, from nα
2
, and
zero-pad the bit strings of Wd1,s and Wd2,s accordingly. Additionally, we decrease the sizes of
W
(1)
l , W
(2)
l , l = 1, 2, to n
1−αǫ
2
bits, instead of n1−α
2
. Once again, we assume that nαǫ
2
and
nα1,ǫ
2
are integers; as minor modifications can be adopted otherwise.
Let us fix the subsets S1, S2 ⊆ [1 : n]. For the corresponding (fixed) values of α1 and α2, the
cache placement codebook Cc,n can be viewed as a wiretap code with 2
n(1−α1,ǫ) bins. Each bin
is indexed by the message
wc =
(
mc, m˜
(1)
c,1 , m˜
(1)
c,2, m˜
(2)
c,1, m˜
(2)
c,2 , · · · , m˜
(n
α2,ǫ
2 )
c,1 , m˜
(n
α2,ǫ
2 )
c,2
)
. (29)
Each bin wc contains 2
nα1,ǫ binary codewords which are indexed by the randomization message
w˜c =
(
m˜
(n
α2,ǫ
2
+1)
c,1 , m˜
(n
α2,ǫ
2
+1)
c,2 , m˜
(n
α2,ǫ
2
+2)
c,1 , m˜
(n
α2,ǫ
2
+2)
c,2 , · · · , m˜
(nαǫ2 )
c,1 , m˜
(nαǫ2 )
c,2
)
. (30)
Similarly, the delivery codebook Cd,n can be seen as a wiretap code with 2
n(1−α2,ǫ) bins, each
of which is indexed by the message
wd =
(
md, m˜
(nαǫ2 )
d,1 , m˜
(nαǫ2 )
d,2 , m˜
(nαǫ2 −1)
d,1 , m˜
(nαǫ2 −1)
d,2 , · · · , m˜
(n
α2,ǫ
2
+1)
d,1 , m˜
(n
α2,ǫ
2
+1)
d,2
)
. (31)
Each bin wd contains 2
nα2,ǫ codewords, indexed by the randomization message
w˜d =
(
m˜
(n
α2,ǫ
2 )
d,1 , m˜
(n
α2,ǫ
2 )
d,2 , m˜
(n
α2,ǫ
2
−1)
d,1 , m˜
(n
α2,ǫ
2
−1)
d,2 , · · · , m˜
(1)
d,1, m˜
(1)
d,2
)
. (32)
Let
{
Bwc : wc = 1, 2, · · · , 2
n(1−α1,ǫ)
}
and
{
Bwd : wd = 1, 2, · · · , 2
n(1−α2,ǫ)
}
denote the
partition, i.e., bins, of the codebooks Cc,n and Cd,n, which correspond to the messages wc and
wd in (29) and (31), respectively. Let x
2n , (xnc ,x
n
d
) denote the concatenation of the two
length-n binary codewords xnc , x
n
d
. Define the Cartesian product of the bins Bwc and Bwd , as
Bwc,wd ,
{
x
2n = (xnc ,x
n
d
) : xnc ∈ Bwc , x
n
d
∈ Bwd
}
. (33)
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Since the partitioning of the codebooks Cc,n and Cd,n is random, for every wc and wd, Bwc,wd
is a random codebook which results from the Cartesian product of the random bins Bwc, Bwd .
Recall that Bwc contains 2
nα1,ǫ and Bwd contains 2
nα2,ǫ length-n binary codewords. Thus, the
product Bwc,wd contains 2
nαǫ length-2n binary codewords.
Let
{
W
(1)
dl,s
,W
(2)
dl,s
, · · · ,W
(nαǫ2 )
dl,s
}
and
{
K
(1)
l , K
(2)
l , · · · , K
(nαǫ2 )
l
}
denote the binary bit strings
of Wdl,s and Kl, l = 1, 2. In addition, for notational simplicity, define
W
(1)
s =
{
W
(1)
d1,s
,W
(1)
d2,s
, · · · ,W
(n
α2,ǫ
2 )
d1,s
,W
(n
α2,ǫ
2 )
d2,s
}
, (34)
W
(2)
s =
{
W
(n
α2,ǫ
2
+1)
d1,s
,W
(n
α2,ǫ
2
+1)
d2,s
, · · · ,W
(nαǫ2 )
d1,s
,W
(nαǫ2 )
d2,s
}
, (35)
K
(1) =
{
K
(1)
1 , K
(1)
2 , · · · , K
(n
α2,ǫ
2 )
1 , K
(n
α2,ǫ
2 )
2
}
, (36)
K
(2) =
{
K
(n
α2,ǫ
2
+1)
1 , K
(n
α2,ǫ
2
+1)
2 , · · · , K
(nαǫ2 )
1 , K
(nαǫ2 )
2
}
, (37)
W
(1)
⊕K =
{
W
(i)
d1,s
⊕K
(i)
1 ,W
(i)
d2,s
⊕K
(i)
2 : i = 1, 2, · · · , n
α2,ǫ
2
}
, (38)
W
(2)
⊕K =
{
W
(i)
d1,s
⊕K
(i)
1 ,W
(i)
d2,s
⊕K
(i)
2 : i = n
α2,ǫ
2
+ 1, n
α2,ǫ
2
+ 2, · · · , n
αǫ
2
}
. (39)
Let Wc, W˜c, Wd, and W˜d denote the random variables that correspond to the realizations
defined in (29)–(32). Using (24)–(27), (29)–(32), and (36)–(39), we have
Wc =
{
Mc,K
(1)
}
=
{
W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 ,K
(1)
}
, W˜c = K
(2) (40)
Wd =
{
Md,W
(2)
⊕K
}
=
{
W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
,W
(2)
⊕K
}
, W˜d = W
(1)
⊕K. (41)
Notice that W˜c and W˜d are independent, and each is uniformly distributed. {W˜c, W˜d} is thus
jointly uniform. In addition, {W˜c, W˜d} is independent from {Wc,Wd}. Thus, we can apply the
analysis in [38, (94)-(103)] to show that, for every S1, S2, wc, and wd, and every ǫ > 0, there
exists γ(ǫ) > 0 such that
PBwc,wd
(
D
(
P
Zn
S1
Zn
S2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd||PZnS1ZnS2
)
> ǫ
)
≤ exp
(
−enγ(ǫ)
)
. (42)
P
Zn
S1
Zn
S2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd is the induced distribution at the adversary when xnc (wc, w˜c) and xnd(wd, w˜d)
are the transmitted codewords over cache placement and delivery phases. PZn
S1
Zn
S2
is the output
distribution at the adversary.
The number of the messages {wc, wd} is 2
n(2−αǫ). Additionally, the number of possible choices
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for the subsets S1 and S2 is
(
2n
αn
)
< 22n. Thus, the combined number of the messages and the
subsets is at most exponential in n. Using (42) and the union bound, as in [38], [39], we have
lim
n→∞
max
S1,S2
I
(
Wc,Wd;Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
)
= 0. (43)
For the sake of completeness, we provide the full proofs for (42) and (43) in Appendix F.
We also have, for any d = (d1, d2), d1, d2 ∈ {1, 2},
I
(
W1,W2;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
= I
(
W
(1)
1 ,W
(2)
1 ,W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
2 ,W1,s,W2,s;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
(44)
= I
(
W
(1)
1 ,W
(2)
1 ,W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
2 ,W
(1)
s ,W
(2)
s ;Z
n
S1,Z
n
S2
)
(45)
= I
(
W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 ,W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
,W(1)s ,W
(2)
s ;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
(46)
= I
(
Mc,Md,W
(1)
s ,W
(2)
s ;Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
)
(47)
≤ I
(
Mc,Md,W
(1)
s ,W
(2)
⊕K;Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
)
(48)
= I
(
Mc,W
(1)
s ,Wd;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
(49)
= H
(
Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
)
−H
(
Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
∣∣∣Mc,W(1)s ,Wd) . (50)
Equation (45) follows since, for d = (d1, d2), Z
n
S1
and ZnS2 depend only on W
(1)
1 , W
(2)
1 , W
(1)
2 ,
W
(2)
2 , Wd1,s, and Wd2,s, and by using (34) and (35). Equation (46) follows because there exists
a bijection between {W
(1)
1 ,W
(2)
1 ,W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
2 } and
{
W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 ,W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
}
.
Equation (47) follows from (24) and (26). The inequality in (48) follows due to the Markov
chain W
(2)
s −
{
Mc,Md,W
(1)
s ,W
(2)
⊕K
}
−
{
Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
}
, and the data processing inequality. This
Markov chain holds because
{
Mc,Md,W
(1)
s
}
are independent from
{
W
(2)
s ,K(2)
}
, and only
the encrypted information W
(2)
⊕K is transmitted. Equation (49) follows from (41).
The second term on the right hand side of (50) can be lower bounded as
H
(
Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
∣∣∣Mc,W(1)s ,Wd) = H (ZnS1 ,ZnS2 ,W(1)s ∣∣∣Mc,Wd)−H (W(1)s ∣∣Mc,Wd) (51)
= H
(
Z
n
S1
,ZnS2 ,W
(1)
s ,W
(1)
⊕K
∣∣∣Mc,Wd)
−H
(
W
(1)
⊕K
∣∣∣Mc,Wd,W(1)s ,ZnS1,ZnS2)−H (W(1)s ) (52)
= H
(
Z
n
S1
,ZnS2 ,K
(1),W
(1)
⊕K
∣∣∣Mc,Wd)
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−H
(
K
(1)
∣∣∣Mc,Wd,W(1)s ,ZnS1,ZnS2)−H (W(1)s ) (53)
≥ H
(
Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2 ,K
(1),W
(1)
⊕K
∣∣∣Mc,Wd)−H (W(1)s )− ǫ′n (54)
≥ H
(
K
(1)
∣∣∣Mc,Wd)+H (ZnS1 ,ZnS2∣∣∣Mc,K(1),Wd)−H (W(1)s )− ǫ′n (55)
= H
(
Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
∣∣∣Wc,Wd)+H (K(1))−H (W(1)s )− ǫ′n (56)
= H
(
Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
∣∣∣Wc,Wd)− ǫ′n, (57)
where ǫ′n → 0 as n → ∞. Equation (52) follows since W
(1)
s is independent from {Mc,Wd}.
Equation (53) follows because there exists a bijection between
{
W
(1)
s ,W
(1)
⊕K
}
and
{
K
(1),W
(1)
⊕K
}
.
Equation (56) follows from (40), and since K(1) is independent from {Mc,Wd}. Equation (57)
follows since K(1) and W
(1)
s are independent and identically distributed.
The inequality in (54) follows because, given
{
Mc,W
(1)
s ,Wd
}
, and for n sufficiently large,
the adversary can decodeK(1) using its observations ZnS1 and Z
n
S2
. In particular,
{
Mc,W
(1)
s ,Wd
}
determine a partition of the codebook into bins, each of which contains 2nαǫ binary codewords.
For n sufficiently large, and given the values of Mc, W
(1)
s , Wd, i.e., the bin index, the adversary
can determine the codeword index inside the bin, and hence decode K(1). We conclude that,
H
(
K
(1)
∣∣∣Mc,Wd,W(1)s ,ZnS1 ,ZnS2) ≤ ǫ′n, where ǫ′n → 0 as n→∞.
Substituting (57) in (50) gives
I
(
W1,W2;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
≤ I
(
Wc,Wd;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
+ ǫ′n. (58)
Using (43) and (58), the secrecy constraint in (3) is satisfied. Since ǫn → 0 as n → ∞, we
conclude that, the achievable strong secrecy file rate is
Rs(α) = 2×
1− α
2
+
α
2
= 1−
α
2
. (59)
Remark 7 Although the cache placement and delivery codebooks, Cc,n and Cd,n, are designed
and generated disjointly, in the security analysis, we have considered the Cartesian products of
the individual bins of the two codebooks. We were able to do so since the input distributions
for generating the two codebooks are identical, i.e., uniform binary. 
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D. Achievability for α ∈ [1, 2]:
For α ∈ [1, 2], we adapt the achievability scheme described in Section IV-C as follows. The
messages W1 and W2 are uniform over
[
1 : 2n
2−αǫ
2
]
; αǫ is defined in (28). The transmitter
generates the independent keys K1, K2, uniform over
[
1 : 2n
2−αǫ
2
]
, and independent from W1,
W2. In addition, the transmitter, independently from W1, W2, K1, K2, generates the independent
randomization messages W˜ and W˜K , uniformly over
[
1 : 2n(αǫ−1)
]
.
The messages for cache placement at receivers 1 and 2 are
Mc,1 = K1, Mc,2 = K2. (60)
That is, receiver j, j = 1, 2, stores the key Kj in its cache memory. The message to be securely
transmitted during delivery is
Md = {Md,1,Md,2} ; Md,1 =Wd1 ⊕K1, Md,2 =Wd2 ⊕K2. (61)
Let
{
W
(1)
dl
, · · · ,W
(n 2−αǫ2 )
dl
}
,
{
K
(1)
l , · · · , K
(n 2−αǫ
2
)
l
}
, and
{
M
(1)
d,l , · · · ,M
(n 2−αǫ
2
)
d,l
}
denote the bit
strings of Wdl , Kl, and Md,l, l = 1, 2.
Notice that, for α ∈ [1, 2], the adversary can see all symbols in at least one of the phases.
Hence, unlike Section IV-C, we cannot utilize randomization messages, W˜ and W˜K , to carry
any information; only keys are stored in the cache memories of the receivers. Additionally, the
cache placement and delivery codebooks for this case have a different embedding structure than
for α ∈ (0, 1) in Section IV-C. In particular, the embedding here is performed on the bits of
the messages Mc and Md, while the embedding in Section IV-C is performed on the bits of the
randomization messages M˜c and M˜d.
Cache Placement Codebook Generation: During cache placement, the transmitter generates
Cc,n as follows. The transmitter randomly and independently divides all the 2
n length-n binary
sequences into 2 bins, indexed by K
(1)
1 , and each contains 2
n−1 codewords. These two bins
are further randomly and independently divided into two sub-bins, indexed by K
(1)
2 , and each
contains 2n−2 codewords. The process continues, going overK
(2)
1 ,K
(2)
2 , · · · ,K
(n 2−αǫ2 )
1 ,K
(n 2−αǫ2 )
2 ,
until the remaining 2n(αǫ−1) codewords, after each sequence of divisions, are indexed by W˜K .
Cache Encoder: The transmitter sends Xnc which corresponds to the keys K1, K2, and the
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randomization message W˜K , i.e., X
n
c
(
K
(1)
1 , K
(1)
2 , · · · , K
(n 2−αǫ2 )
1 , K
(n 2−αǫ2 )
2 , W˜K
)
.
Delivery Codebook Generation: In the delivery phase, the transmitter generates Cd,n as follows.
The transmitter randomly and independently divides all the 2n length-n binary sequences into
two bins, indexed by M
(n 2−αǫ2 )
d,1 , and each contains 2
n−1 codewords. These two bins are further
randomly and independently divided into two sub-bins, indexed by M
(n 2−αǫ2 )
d,2 , and each contains
2n−2 codewords. The process continues, going in reverse order over M
(n 2−αǫ2 −1)
d,1 , M
(n 2−αǫ2 −1)
d,2 ,
· · · , M
(1)
d,1, M
(1)
d,2, until the remaining 2
n(αǫ−1) codewords, after each sequence of divisions, are
indexed by the randomization message W˜ .
Delivery Encoder: Given W1, W2, K1, K2, W˜ , and d = (d1, d2), the transmitter forms Md,1
and Md,2 as in (61) and sends X
n
d
which corresponds to Md,1, Md,2, and W˜ , i.e.,
X
n
d
(
M
(n 2−αǫ2 )
d,1 ,M
(n 2−αǫ2 )
d,2 , · · · ,M
(1)
d,1,M
(1)
d,2, W˜
)
.
Decoding: Using Xnc , receiver j, j = 1, 2, recovers Mc,j = Kj and stores it in its cache
memory. Using Xn
d
, both receivers recover Md = {Md,1,Md,2}. Using Md,j , Kj , and for n
sufficiently large, receiver j correctly decodes Wdj .
Security Analysis: Fix the subsets S1, S2. Recall that α1, α2 ≤ 1. Since α ≥ 1, α1, α2 ≥ α−1.
If α1 = 1, then α2 = α− 1, and vice versa. In addition, notice that 1− α1, 1− α2 ≤ 2− α.
As in Section IV-C, for a fixed value of α1, the codebook Cc,n is a wiretap code with 2
n(1−α1,ǫ)
bins, indexed by
Wc =
(
K
(1)
1 , K
(1)
2 , · · · , K
(
n
1−α1,ǫ
2
)
1 , K
(
n
1−α1,ǫ
2
)
2
)
. (62)
Each bin Wc contains 2
nα1,ǫ binary codewords, indexed by
W˜c =
(
K
(
n
1−α1,ǫ
2
+1
)
1 , K
(
n
1−α1,ǫ
2
+1
)
2 , · · · , K
(n 2−αǫ2 )
1 , K
(n 2−αǫ2 )
2 , W˜K
)
. (63)
Similarly, for a fixed value of α2, the codebook Cd,n is a wiretap code with 2
n(1−α2,ǫ) bins,
each is indexed by
Wd =
(
M˜
(n 2−αǫ2 )
d,1 , M˜
(n 2−αǫ2 )
d,2 , · · · , M˜
(
n
1−α1,ǫ
2
+1
)
d,1 , M˜
(
n
1−α1,ǫ
2
+1
)
d,2
)
. (64)
Each bin Wd contains 2
nα2,ǫ codewords, indexed by
W˜d =
(
M˜
(
n
1−α1,ǫ
2
)
d,1 , M˜
(
n
1−α1,ǫ
2
)
d,2 , · · · , M˜
(1)
d,1, M˜
(1)
d,2, W˜
)
. (65)
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Let us re-define
K
(1) =
{
K
(i)
1 , K
(i)
2 : i = 1, · · · , n
1− α1,ǫ
2
}
, (66)
K
(2) =
{
K
(i)
1 , K
(i)
2 : i = n
1− α1,ǫ
2
+ 1, · · · , n
2− αǫ
2
}
, (67)
W
(1)
⊕K =
{
W
(i)
d1
⊕K
(i)
1 ,W
(i)
d2
⊕K
(i)
2 : i = 1, · · · , n
1− α1,ǫ
2
}
, (68)
W
(2)
⊕K =
{
W
(i)
d1
⊕K
(i)
1 ,W
(i)
d2
⊕K
(i)
2 : i = n
1− α1,ǫ
2
+ 1, · · · , n
2− αǫ
2
}
, (69)
and define
W
(1) =
{
W
(i)
d1
,W
(i)
d2
: i = 1, · · · , n
1− α1,ǫ
2
}
, (70)
W
(2) =
{
W
(i)
d1
,W
(i)
d2
: i = n
1− α1,ǫ
2
+ 1, · · · , n
2− αǫ
2
}
, (71)
From (62)-(69), we have
Wc = K
(1), W˜c =
{
K
(2), W˜K
}
, Wd = W
(2)
⊕K, W˜d =
{
W
(1)
⊕K, W˜
}
. (72)
Similar to Section IV-C, W˜c, W˜d, are independent and uniformly distributed, and hence {W˜c, W˜d}
is jointly uniform. Additionally, {W˜c, W˜d} is independent from {Wc,Wd}. Thus, (43) is satisfied.
We also have, for any d = (d1, d2),
I
(
W1,W2;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
= I
(
W
(1),W(2);ZnS1 ,Z
n
S2
)
(73)
≤ I
(
W
(1),W
(2)
⊕K;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
(74)
= I
(
W
(1),Wd;Z
n
S1,Z
n
S2
)
(75)
= H
(
Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
−H
(
Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
∣∣∣W(1),Wd) (76)
≤ H
(
Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
)
−H
(
Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
∣∣∣K(1),Wd)+ ǫ′n (77)
= I(Wc,Wd;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2) + ǫ
′
n. (78)
The inequality in (74) follows due to the Markov chain W(2) −
{
W
(1),W
(2)
⊕K
}
−
{
Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
}
.
Equations (75) and (78) follow from (72). The inequality in (77) follows by using similar steps
as in (51)-(57). Using (43) and (78), the secrecy constraint in (3) is satisfied. Since ǫn → 0 as
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n→∞, the achievable strong secrecy file rate is
Rs(α) =
2− α
2
= 1−
α
2
. (79)
This completes the proof for Theorem 1.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this section, we extend the achievability scheme presented in Section IV and provide a
lower bound on the achievable strong secrecy file rate when D > 2. The demand vector is again
denoted by d = (d1, d2), where d1, d2 ∈ [1 : D]. As in Section IV, we divide the proof into two
cases for the ranges α ∈ (0, 1) and α ∈ [1, 2].
A. α ∈ [1, 2]
For α ∈ [1, 2], we utilize the same achievability scheme in Section IV-D. The reason behind
this is, for this range of α, only the keys K1, K2, are transmitted in the cache placement, and
stored in receivers 1 and 2 cache memories, respectively. That is, no information messages are
stored in the caches, and the user demands are known during the delivery phase. The achievable
strong secrecy file rate is 1− α
2
.
B. α ∈ (0, 1)
The achievability scheme for this case has the same channel coding structure as in the scheme
described in Section IV-C. The difference however lies in generating the messages to be securely
communicated over cache placement and delivery phases, i.e., Mc and Md. In particular, we
utilize here uncoded placement for designing the cache contents, and a partially coded delivery
transmission that is simultaneously useful for both receivers.
The transmitter dividesWl, l ∈ [1 : D], into the independent messages
{
W
(1)
l ,W
(2)
l ,Wl,t,Wl,s
}
.
W
(1)
l ,W
(2)
l , are uniform over
[
1 : 2n
1−αǫ
2D
]
; αǫ is defined in (28).Wl,t is uniform over
[
1 : 2n
(2D−1)(1−αǫ)
4D
]
,
and Wl,s is uniform over
[
1 : 2n
αǫ
2
]
. The transmitter, independently from W[1:D], generates the
independent keys K1, K2, uniformly distributed over
[
1 : 2n
αǫ
2
]
.
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Let Mc = {Mc,1,Mc,2}. Unlike (24), we utilize here uncoded placement for designing Mc,1
and Mc,2. We have,
Mc,1 =
{
W
(1)
1 ,W
(1)
2 , · · · ,W
(1)
D
}
, (80)
Mc,2 =
{
W
(2)
1 ,W
(2)
2 , · · · ,W
(2)
D
}
. (81)
The randomization message for cache placement, M˜c = {M˜c,1, M˜c,2}, is identical to (25). That
is, M˜c,1 = K1 and M˜c,2 = K2. Receiver j stores Mc,j and M˜c,j in its cache memory.
Unlike (26), we utilize here partially coded delivery. The message to be securely transmitted
during the delivery phase is
Md =
{
W
(1)
d2
⊕W
(2)
d1
,Wd1,t,Wd2,t
}
. (82)
The randomization message for delivery, M˜d, is identical to (27).
Remark 8 Notice that the sizes of Mc, Md, M˜c, and M˜d, are the same as in Section IV-C. In
particular, the sizes of M˜c and M˜d are both nαǫ bits. The size of Mc is given by
2×D × n
1− αǫ
2D
= n(1− αǫ) bits, (83)
and the size of Md is given by
n
1− αǫ
2D
+ 2× n
(2D − 1)(1− αǫ)
4D
= n(1− αǫ) bits. (84)

Codebooks Generation and Encoders: For the messages Mc, Md, M˜c, and M˜d defined above,
the cache placement and delivery codebooks, Cc,n and Cd,n, and the cache and delivery encoders,
are designed in the same exact manner as in Section IV-C, see Figures 3 and 4.
Decoding: As in Section IV-C, usingMd, M˜d,Mc,j , M˜c,j , and for n sufficiently large, receiver
j correctly decodes Wdj , j = 1, 2.
Security analysis: Let Wc, W˜c, Wd, and W˜d, be defined as in (29)-(32), (40), and (41). Once
again, W˜c and W˜d are independent and uniform, and hence {W˜c, W˜d} is jointly uniform. In
addition, {Wc,Wd} are independent from {W˜c, W˜d}. Thus, (43) holds for this case.
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For any d = (d1, d2), we have
I
(
W[1:D];Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
= I
({
W
(1)
l ,W
(2)
l ,Wl,t,Wl,s
}D
l=1
;ZnS1 ,Z
n
S2
)
(85)
≤ I
(
Mc,
{
W
(1)
l ,W
(2)
l ,Wl,t,Wl,s
}D
l=1
;ZnS1,Z
n
S2
)
(86)
≤ I
(
Mc,W
(1)
d2
⊕W
(2)
d1
,Wd1,t,Wd2,t,Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
)
(87)
= I
(
Mc,Md,Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
(88)
≤ I
(
Wc,Wd;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
+ ǫ′n, (89)
where (87) follows form the Markov chainW[1:D]−
{
Mc,W
(1)
d2
⊕W
(2)
d1
,Wd1,t,Wd2,t,Wd1,s,Wd2,s
}
−{
Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
}
; (88) follows from (82), and (89) follows using similar steps as in (46)-(57). Using
(43) and (89), the secrecy constraint in (3) is satisfied.
With ǫn → 0 as n→∞, the achievable strong secrecy file rate is
Rs(α) = 2×
1− α
2D
+
(2D − 1)(1− α)
4D
+
α
2
(90)
=
1
2
+
3(1− α)
4D
. (91)
This completes the proof for Theorem 2.
Remark 9 For D = 2, the achievable secrecy rate in (91) is strictly smaller than the secrecy
rate obtained by coded placement and uncoded delivery in Section IV-C, i.e., 1− α
2
. 
Remark 10 An achievability scheme which utilizes coded placement and uncoded delivery, as
in Section IV-C, achieves the same secure file rate as (91) for D = 3. However, this scheme
achieves a strictly smaller secure file rate for D ≥ 4. In this scheme, W
(1)
l and W
(2)
l are uniform
over
[
1 : 2n
1−αǫ
2(D−1)
]
. Wl,t is uniform over
[
1 : 2n
(D−2)(1−αǫ)
2(D−1)
]
. Wl,s, K1 and K2, are uniform over[
1 : 2n
αǫ
2
]
. Mc = {Mc,1,Mc,2} and Md are given by
Mc,1 =
{
W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 ,W
(1)
2 ⊕W
(1)
3 , · · · ,W
(1)
D−1 ⊕W
(1)
D
}
, (92)
Mc,2 =
{
W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 ,W
(2)
2 ⊕W
(2)
3 , · · · ,W
(2)
D−1 ⊕W
(2)
D
}
, (93)
Md =
{
W
(1)
d2
,W
(2)
d1
,Wd1,t,Wd2,t
}
. (94)
Without loss of generality, let d1 < d2. For any d = (d1, d2), usingMc,j in (92) and (93), receiver
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j, can restore W
(j)
d1
⊕W
(j)
d2
by xor-ing
{
W
(j)
d1
⊕W
(j)
d1+1
}
,
{
W
(j)
d1+1
⊕W
(j)
d1+2
}
,· · · ,
{
W
(j)
d2−1
⊕W
(j)
d2
}
.
The achievable strong secrecy file rate using this scheme is Rs(α) =
1
2
+ 1−α
2(D−1)
. 
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
When α ∈ [1, 2], the upper bound on Rs, stated in Theorem 3 for D > 2, follows as in Section
IV-A. Thus, it remains to prove the upper bound for α ∈ (0, 1). The proof is divided into the
three following steps.
Step 1: We first upper bound Rs by the secrecy capacity when the adversary is restricted to tap
into the delivery transmission only, denoted as CRess . That is, C
Res
s is the maximum achievable
file rate when α1 = 0 and α2 = α. Restricting the adversary to only tap into the delivery phase
cannot decrease the secrecy capacity, i.e., Rs ≤ C
Res
s , since this setting is included in the feasible
strategy space for the adversary. The cache placement transmission is secure, and each receiver
has a secure cache memory of size n
2
bits.
Step 2: We upper bound CRess by the secrecy capacity, i.e., the maximum achievable file rate,
when the delivery channel to the adversary is replaced by a discrete memoryless binary erasure
channel, with erasure probability 1 − α, denoted as CDMs . The proof for this step follows the
same lines as in [39, Section V]. The idea is when the binary erasure channel produces a number
of erasures greater than or equal to (1−α)n, the adversary’s channel in this discrete memoryless
setup is worse than its channel in the former model, i.e., when it encounters exactly (1 − α)n
erasures and is able to select their positions. Hence, CRess ≤ C
DM
s for this case. The result
follows by utilizing Sanov’s theorem in method of types [46, Theorem 11.4.1] to show that the
probability of the binary erasure channel causing a number of erasures less than (1− α)n goes
to zero as n→∞.
Step 3: From Step 1, each receiver has a secure cache of size n
2
bits. Since increasing the cache
sizes cannot decrease the achievable file rate, we further upper bound CDMs with the maximum
achievable file rate when each receiver has a cache memory of size n bits, in which it stores
X
n
c . Receiver j, j = 1, 2, utilizes both X
n
c and X
n
d
in order to decode its desired message Wdj ,
i.e., Wˆdj = gd,j (X
n
c ,X
n
d
), d = (d1, d2). This setup is thus equivalent to a single receiver, with a
cache of size n bits, who demands two files Wd1 ,Wd2 , and utilizes the decoder gd , {gd,1, gd,2}
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Let us denote the maximum achievable file rate for this single receiver model as CSRs . We have
CDMs ≤ C
SR
s . In the following, we upper bound C
SR
s .
Let MD denote the fraction of the size-n bits cache memory dedicated to store (coded or
uncoded) information bits, and let MK denote the fraction dedicated to store key bits. That is,
MD +MK = 1. Let SD denote the information bits stored in this memory, i.e., SD = fD(W[1:D])
and H(SD) = nMD. We utilize the following lemma in order to upper bound C
SR
s .
Lemma 1 [33, Lemma 1] For a fixed allocation of MD and MK, and a receiver who demands
the files Wd1 and Wd2 , the secrecy rate for the single receiver model is upper bounded as
2RSRs ≤ min {1, 1− α +MK}+
1
n
I (Wd1 ,Wd2 ;SD) . (95)
Notice that (95) holds for any demand pair d = (d1, d2) such that d1 6= d2, i.e., the worst-case
demands. Summing over all such demands, we have
2RSRs ≤ min {1, 1− α +MK}+
1
nD(D − 1)
∑
d1,d2∈[1:D], d1 6=d2
I (Wd1 ,Wd2 ;SD) . (96)
The second term on the right hand side of (96) can be written as
1
nD(D − 1)
∑
d1,d2∈[1:D], d1 6=d2
I (Wd1 ,Wd2 ;SD)
=
1
nD
∑
d1∈[1:D]
I (Wd1 ;SD) +
1
nD(D − 1)
∑
d1,d2∈[1:D], d1 6=d2
I (Wd2 ;SD|Wd1) (97)
≤
1
nD
∑
d1∈[1:D]
I (Wd1 ;SD) +
1
nD(D − 1)
∑
d1∈[1:D]

 ∑
d2∈[1:D]
I (Wd2 ;SD|Wd1)

 . (98)
For any d1 ∈ [1 : D], we have
∑
d2∈[1:D]
I
(
Wd2 ;SD
∣∣Wd1) = D∑
d2=1
[
H
(
Wd2
∣∣Wd1)−H (Wd2∣∣Wd1 , SD)] (99)
≤
D∑
d2=1
[
H
(
Wd2
∣∣W1,W2, · · · ,Wd2−1,Wd1)−H (Wd2∣∣W1,W2, · · · ,Wd2−1,Wd1 , SD)] (100)
= I
(
W1,W2, · · · ,WD;SD
∣∣Wd1) (101)
≤ H(SD) = nMD, (102)
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where (100) follows because when d2 = d1,H (Wd2 |Wd1) = H (Wd2 |W1,W2, · · · ,Wd2−1,Wd1) =
0, and when d2 6= d1, H (Wd2 |Wd1) = H (Wd2 |W1,W2, · · · ,Wd2−1,Wd1) = H(Wd2).
Similarly, we have
∑
d1∈[1:D]
I (Wd1 ;SD) ≤ H(SD) = nMD. (103)
Substituting (102) and (103) in (98) gives
1
nD(D − 1)
∑
d1,d2∈[1:D], d1 6=d2
I (Wd1 ,Wd2 ;SD) ≤
2D − 1
D(D − 1)
MD. (104)
Thus, using (96) and (104), RSRs is further upper bounded as
RSRs ≤
1
2
[
min {1, 1− α +MK}+
2D − 1
D(D − 1)
MD
]
. (105)
Finally, by maximizing over all possible allocations for MD and MK such that MD+MK = 1,
we obtain
CSRs ≤
1
2
max
MD,MK:
MD+MK=1
{
min {1, 1− α +MK}+
2D − 1
D(D − 1)
MD
}
(106)
=
1
2
[
1 +
2D − 1
D(D − 1)
(1− α)
]
. (107)
Equation (107) follows because, for D ≥ 3, the maximum occurs at MK = α and MD = 1−α.
This completes the proof for Theorem 3.
Remark 11 An upper bound considering uncoded placement only can be derived as follows.
The same analysis as in (95)-(107) carries through with I(Wd2 ;SD|Wd1) in (97) is equal to
I(Wd2 ;SD). Hence the right hand side of (104) is replaced by
2MD
D
. The resulting bound Rs ≤
1
2
+ (1−α)
D
is tighter than (107). 
VII. DISCUSSION
While the fixed-size cache memory setup considered in this paper can be seen as a clean basic
model for the intricate problem in consideration, it also allows us to obtain results and insights
that are generalizable to more involved cache memory models. In particular, the extension to
variable memory sizes can be done by considering multiple communication blocks for cache
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placement. Our results and coding scheme readily apply to an adversary model whose tapping
capability during the delivery is normalized with respect to tapping during cache placement,
i.e., µ1 + Bµ2 ≤ µ; B is the number of communication blocks for cache placement. This is a
reasonable assumption given that cache placement generally takes place in a longer period than
delivery. The problem turns to be more challenging when the adversary optimizes its tapping
uniformly over the multiple blocks for cache placement as well as the delivery phase. This is
left for future investigation.
It is typical to model the cache placement as a noiseless channel since placement is assumed
to occur when networks are not congested and their rates are assumed to be large enough. Here
however we model the cache placement as a broadcast channel communication. The broadcast
model avails a clean and tractable solution without compromising its generalizability. A time
division multiple access (TDMA) model for cache placement is a special case by imposing
an additional constraint in which each receiver has to decode its desired file using only one
half of the transmitted codeword. Additionally, the broadcast model is in line with the network
information theory literature and it does not limit the cache placement to occur over low rate
traffic. With the ever-growing user demands, placement and delivery occurring in less asymmetric
network loads is likely to be expected in the near future.
Corollary 1 demonstrates that, for the model considered in this paper, when α ∈ [1, 2], the
strong secrecy capacity is equal to 1− α
2
for any library size. For α ∈ [1, 2], {S1 = [1 : n], S2 ⊂
[1 : n]} and {S1 ⊂ [1 : n], S2 = [1 : n]} are two possible strategies for the adversary. In
other words, the adversary can tap into either all transmitted symbols in cache placement and
a subset of symbols in the delivery, or all transmitted symbols in the delivery and a subset of
symbols in cache placement. Such an adversary limits the communication for cache placement,
i.e., the use of cache memories, to exchanging additional randomness (key bits) that allows for
communicating a positive secure rate over the two phases. In other words, the cache memories
are not utilized to store any data bits, and hence the lack of knowledge of user demands during
cache placement is immaterial.
For a library with two files, if the receivers were to have cache memories of size n bits
in which they store the transmitted signal during cache placement, the strong secrecy file rate
in Theorem 1 is achievable using a simple wiretap code. In particular, the transmitter encodes
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W = (W1,W2) ∈ [1 : 2
n2R] into a length-2n binary codeword using a wiretap code, and sends
the first n bits of this codeword during cache placement and the last n bits during delivery.
Each receiver can thus decode both files, and the secrecy of W1 and W2 against the adversary
follows by the results in [38], [39]. In caching problems, the relevant setup however is when the
receivers have cache memories of limited size with respect to the overall transmission during
cache placement. This calls for the limited size cache memory model considered in this paper,
which in turn necessitates the use of the more elaborate coding scheme in Section IV.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have introduced the caching broadcast channel with a a wire and cache tapping adversary
of type II. In this broadcast model, each receiver is equipped with a fixed-size cache memory,
and the adversary is able to tap into a subset of its choosing of the transmitted symbols during
cache placement, or delivery, or both. The legitimate terminals have no knowledge about the
fractions of the tapped symbols in each phase, or their positions. Only the size of the overall
tapped set is known. We have identified the strong secrecy capacity of this model, i.e., the
maximum achievable file rate while keeping the overall library secure, when the transmitter’s
library has two files. We have derived lower and upper bounds for the strong secrecy file rate
when the transmitter has more than two files in its library. We have devised an achievability
scheme which combines wiretap coding, security embedding codes, one-time pad keys, and coded
caching techniques. The results presented in this paper highlight the robustness of (stochastic)
coding against a smart adversary who performs a chosen attack, jointly optimized over both cache
placement and delivery phases. Future directions include investigating a tighter upper bound for
a library with more than two files, and exploring the extensions of this work to variable cache
memory sizes, more than two users, and a noisy legitimate channel.
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APPENDIX A
SECRECY CONSTRAINT FOR SETTING 1: PROOF OF (11)
For every S1 ⊆ [1 : n] satisfying |S1| = µ, we have
lim
n→∞
I
(
W1,W2;Z
n
S1
)
= lim
n→∞
I
(
W
(1)
1 ,W
(2)
1 ,W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
2 ,W1,s,W2,s;Z
n
S1
)
(108)
= lim
n→∞
I
(
W
(1)
1 ,W
(2)
1 ,W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
2 ;Z
n
S1
)
(109)
≤ lim
n→∞
I
(
W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 ;Z
n
S1
)
(110)
= lim
n→∞
I
(
Mc;Z
n
S1
)
= 0. (111)
Recall that the adversary’s observation over cache placement, ZnS1 , results from sending
Mc = {Mc,1,Mc,2}, where Mc,1 = W
(1)
1 ⊕ W
(1)
2 and Mc,2 = W
(2)
1 ⊕ W
(2)
2 . Thus, (109)
follows because ZnS1 does not depend on {W1,s,W2,s} and (110) follows due to the Markov
chain
{
W
(1)
1 ,W
(2)
1 ,W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
2
}
−
{
W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2
}
−ZnS1 . The second equality in
(111) follows from [38, Theorem 2], and the fact that the rate of Mc is less than 1− α.
APPENDIX B
SECRECY CONSTRAINT FOR SETTING 2: PROOF OF (16)
For every S2 ⊆ [1 : n] satisfying |S2| = µ, and any d = (d1, d2), d1, d2 ∈ {1, 2}, we have
I
(
W1,W2;Z
n
S2
)
= I
(
W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
,Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S2
)
(112)
= I
(
W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
;ZnS2
)
+ I
(
Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S2
∣∣∣W (2)d1 ,W (1)d2 ) (113)
≤ I
(
W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
;ZnS2
)
+ I
(
Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Wd1,s ⊕K1,Wd2,s ⊕K2
∣∣∣W (2)d1 ,W (1)d2 ) (114)
= I
(
W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
;ZnS2) + I(Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Wd1,s ⊕K1,Wd2,s ⊕K2
)
(115)
= I
(
W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
;ZnS2
)
(116)
= I
(
Md;Z
n
S2
)
. (117)
The adversary’s observation over the delivery phase, ZnS2 , results from sendingMd = {W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
}
and the randomization message M˜d = {Wd1,s ⊕K1,Wd2,s ⊕K2}. Equation (112) thus follows
because ZnS2 depends only on W
(2)
d1
, W
(1)
d2
, Wd1,s, and Wd2,s. The inequality in (114) follows
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from the Markov chain {Wd1,s,Wd2,s}−
{
W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
,Wd1,s ⊕K1,Wd2,s ⊕K2
}
−ZnS2 . Equation
(115) follows because
{
W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
}
are independent from {Wd1,s,Wd2,s, K1, K2}.
The randomization message of the wiretap code in the delivery phase, M˜d, is independent
from the message Md. Thus, using (117) and [38, Theorem 2], we have
lim
n→∞
max
S2⊆[1:n]:|S2|=µ
I(W1,W2;Z
n
S2
)
≤ lim
n→∞
max
S2⊆[1:n]: |S2|=µ
I(Md;Z
n
S2) = 0. (118)
APPENDIX C
SECRECY CONSTRAINT FOR SETTING 3 WHEN α1 ≥ α2
Recall that Mc and Md are defined as in (9) and (10), respectively. For a fixed choice of the
subsets S1, S2 ⊆ [1 : n] such that |S1|+ |S2| = µ, and any d = (d1, d2), d1, d2 ∈ {1, 2}, we have
I(W1,W2;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2) = I
(
W
(1)
1 ,W
(2)
1 ,W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
2 ,W1,s,W2,s;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
(119)
= I
(
W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 ,W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
,Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
)
(120)
= I
(
Mc,Md;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
(121)
= I
(
Mc;Z
n
S1,Z
n
S2
)
+ I
(
Md;Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
∣∣Mc) (122)
= I
(
Mc;Z
n
S1
)
+ I
(
Mc;Z
n
S2
∣∣ZnS1)+ I (Md;ZnS2∣∣Mc)+ I (Md;ZnS1∣∣Mc,ZnS2) , (123)
where (120) follows because, for any d1, d2 ∈ {1, 2}, there exists a bijective map between{
W
(1)
1 ,W
(2)
1 ,W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
2
}
and
{
W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 ,W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
}
.
From (9) and (10), Mc and Md are independent. The adversary’s observation in cache place-
ment, ZnS1 , results from sending Mc, while its observation in the delivery phase, Z
n
S2
, results
from sending Md. Thus, for a fixed choice of the subsets S1 and S2,
{
Mc,Z
n
S1
}
are independent
from ZnS2 . We thus have
I
(
Mc;Z
n
S2
|ZnS1
)
= 0. (124)
In addition,
{
Md,Z
n
S2
}
are independent from Mc. Thus,
I
(
Md;Z
n
S2
|Mc
)
= H
(
Z
n
S2
|Mc
)
−H
(
Z
n
S2
|Mc,Md
)
(125)
= H
(
Z
n
S2
|Mc
)
−H
(
Z
n
S2
|Md
)
(126)
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≤ I
(
Md;Z
n
S2
)
. (127)
Finally, using the Markov chain
{
Md,Z
n
S2
}
−Mc − Z
n
S1
, we have
I
(
Md;Z
n
S1
|Mc,Z
n
S2
)
= H
(
Z
n
S1
|Mc,Z
n
S2
)
−H
(
Z
n
S1
|Mc,Z
n
S2
,Md
)
(128)
≤ H
(
Z
n
S1
)
−H
(
Z
n
S1
|Mc
)
= I
(
Mc;Z
n
S1
)
. (129)
Substituting (124), (127), and (129) in (123),
I
(
W1,W2;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
≤ 2I
(
Mc;Z
n
S1
)
+ I
(
Md;Z
n
S2
)
. (130)
The rates of Mc and Md are 1 − α1 − ǫn and 1 − α2 − ǫn, respectively. By applying [38,
Theorem 2] to (130), we have
lim
n→∞
max
S1,S2⊆[1:n]:
|S1|+|S2|=µ
I
(
W1,W2;Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
)
≤ 2 lim
n→∞
max
S1⊆[1:n]: |S1|=µ1
I(Mc;Z
n
S1
) + lim
n→∞
max
S2⊆[1:n]: |S2|=µ2
I
(
Md;Z
n
S2
)
(131)
= 0. (132)
APPENDIX D
SECRECY CONSTRAINT FOR SETTING 3 WHEN α1 < α2
For this case, Mc and Md are defined in (13) and (14) and the randomization message M˜d is
defined in (15). For notational simplicity, let us define
Mc,1\K1 = W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 , Mc,2\K2 =W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 (133)
Mc\K =
{
Mc,1\K1 ,Mc,2\K2
}
. (134)
For a fixed choice of S1, S2 ⊆ [1 : n] such that |S1| + |S2| = µ, and any d = (d1, d2),
d1, d2 ∈ {1, 2}, we have
I
(
W1,W2;Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
)
= I
(
W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 ,W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
,Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
)
(135)
= I
(
Mc\K ,Md,Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
)
(136)
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= I
(
Mc\K ;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
+ I
(
Md;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2|Mc\K
)
+ I
(
Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2 |Md,Mc\K
)
.
(137)
From (13), (14), and (15), Mc is independent from {Md, M˜d}. The adversary’s observation
in cache placement, ZnS1 , results from sending Mc =
{
Mc\K , K1, K2
}
, and its observation in
the delivery results from sending Md =
{
W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
}
and the randomization message M˜d =
{Wd1,s ⊕K1,Wd2,s ⊕W2}. We now upper bound each term on the right hand side of (137). For
the third term, we have
I
(
Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
∣∣Md,Mc\K) ≤ I (Wd1,s,Wd2,s; M˜d∣∣Md,Mc\K) (138)
= I (Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Wd1,s ⊕K1,Wd2,s ⊕K2) = 0, (139)
where (138) follows due to the Markov chain {Wd1,s,Wd2,s} − {Mc\K ,Md, M˜d} − {Z
n
S1
,ZnS2},
and (139) follows because M˜d is independent from {Wd1,s,Wd2,s,Md,Mc\K}.
For a fixed choice of the subsets S1 and S2, Z
n
S2
is independent from
{
Mc,Z
n
S1
}
. Thus, the
first term on the right hand side of (137) is bounded as
I
(
Mc\K ;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
≤ I
(
Mc;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
(140)
= I
(
Mc;Z
n
S1
)
+ I
(
Mc;Z
n
S2
∣∣ZnS1) = I (Mc;ZnS1) . (141)
For the second term on the right hand side of (137), we have
I
(
Md;Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
∣∣Mc\K) = I (Md;ZnS2∣∣Mc\K)+ I (Md;ZnS1∣∣Mc\K ,ZnS2) . (142)
Notice that Mc\K and Z
n
S2
are conditionally independent given Md. Thus,
I
(
Md;Z
n
S2
∣∣Mc\K) = H (ZnS2∣∣Mc\K)−H (ZnS2∣∣Md) ≤ I (Md;ZnS2) . (143)
In addition, using the independence between
{
Md,Z
n
S2
}
and
{
Mc,Z
n
S1
}
, we have
I
(
Md;Z
n
S1
∣∣Mc\K ,ZnS2) = H (ZnS1∣∣Mc\K ,ZnS2)−H (ZnS1∣∣Mc\K ,Md,ZnS2) (144)
≤ H
(
Z
n
S1
)
−H
(
Z
n
S1
∣∣Mc\K , K1, K2,Md,ZnS2) (145)
= H
(
Z
n
S1
)
−H
(
Z
n
S1
∣∣Mc) = I (Mc;ZnS1) . (146)
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Substituting (143) and (146) in (142) gives
I
(
Md;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
∣∣Mc\K) ≤ I (Md;ZnS2)+ I (Mc;ZnS1) . (147)
Finally, substituting (139), (141), (147) in (137), and applying [38, Theorem 2], we have
lim
n→∞
max
S1,S2⊆[1:n]:
|S1|+|S2|=µ
I
(
W1,W2;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
= 0, (148)
since the rates of Mc and Md are 1− α1 − ǫn and 1− α2 − ǫn, respectively.
APPENDIX E
SECRECY CONSTRAINT FOR SETTING 4
For this setting, Mc and Md are defined in (20) and (22), and the randomization messages M˜c
and M˜d are defined in (21) and (23). Notice that,Mc is independent from M˜c;Md is independent
from M˜d, and {Mc, M˜c} are independent from {Md, M˜d}.
Conditioned on a fixed choice of the subsets S1 and S2, which satisfies the conditions for this
setting, i.e., either {|S1| = µ, |S2| = 0} or {|S1| = 0, |S2| = µ}, define the random variable
Z
n
S , Z
n
S1
1{|S2|=0} + Z
n
S2
1{|S1|=0}. (149)
Notice that the random variable ZnS only have a well-defined probability distribution when
conditioned on the event {S1, S2}, since a prior distribution on these subsets is not defined.
For this fixed choice of the subsets, and any d = (d1, d2), d1, d2 ∈ {1, 2}, we have
I
(
W1,W2;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
= I
(
W
(1)
1 ⊕W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
1 ⊕W
(2)
2 ,W
(2)
d1
,W
(1)
d2
,Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
(150)
= I (Mc,Md,Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S) (151)
= 1{|S2|=0} I
(
Mc,Md,Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S
∣∣∣ {|S2| = 0})
+ 1{|S1|=0} I
(
Mc,Md,Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S
∣∣∣ {|S1| = 0}) (152)
= 1{|S2|=0} I
(
Mc,Md,Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S1
)
+ 1{|S1|=0} I
(
Mc,Md,Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S2
)
(153)
= 1{|S2|=0} I
(
Mc;Z
n
S1
)
+ 1{|S1|=0} I
(
Md,Wd1,s,Wd2,s;Z
n
S2
)
(154)
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≤ 1{|S2|=0} I
(
Mc;Z
n
S1
)
+ 1{|S1|=0} I
(
Md;Z
n
S2
)
. (155)
Equation (154) follows because (i) ZnS1 results from {Mc, M˜c} which are independent from
{Md,Wd1,s,Wd2,s}, and (ii) Z
n
S2
is conditionally independent fromMc given {Md,Wd1,s,Wd2,s},
due to the Markov chain Mc − {Md,Wd1,s,Wd2,s} − {Md, M˜d} − Z
n
S2
. The inequality in (155)
follows using the same steps in (112)–(117), in Appendix B.
Finally, since M˜c is independent from Mc; M˜d is independent from Md, and the rates of Mc
and M˜d are both equal to 1− α− ǫn, we have
lim
n→∞
max
S1,S2⊆[1:n]:
|S1|+|S2|=µ
I
(
W1,W2;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
= lim
n→∞
max
S1,S2⊆[1:n]:
|Si|=0, |Sj |=µ
i,j∈{1,2}, i 6=j
I
(
W1,W2;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
(156)
≤ lim
n→∞
max
{
max
S1⊆[1:n]: |S1|=µ
I(Mc;Z
n
S1), maxS2⊆[1:n]: |S2|=µ
I
(
Md;Z
n
S2
)}
(157)
= max
{
lim
n→∞
max
S1⊆[1:n]: |S1|=µ
I(Mc;Z
n
S1), limn→∞
max
S2⊆[1:n]: |S2|=µ
I
(
Md;Z
n
S2
)}
(158)
= 0, (159)
where (157) follows from (155), and (158) follows because both limits exist and equal to zero;
by using [38, Theorem 2].
APPENDIX F
PROOFS FOR (42) AND (43)
Let us fix the subsets S1 and S2, and the messages wc and wd. Consider the Cartesian product
of the random bins Bwc and Bwd , i.e., Bwc,wd, defined in (33). Recall that PZn
S1
Zn
S2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd
denotes the induced distribution at the adversary’s output when the transmitted codewords over
cache placement and delivery phases are xnc (wc, w˜c) and x
n
d
(wd, w˜d), i.e., when (x
n
c ,x
n
d
) belongs
to Bwc,wd . In addition, PZnS1Z
n
S2
denotes the output distribution at the adversary, induced by the
cache placement and delivery codebooks, Cc,n and Cd,n, defined in Figures 3 and 4.
Let zn1 , z
n
2 ∈ Z
n, where Z , {0, 1} ∪ {?}. Define the distribution QZn
S1
Zn
S2
as follows:
QZn
S1
Zn
S2
(zn1 , z
n
2 ) =
∏
i/∈S1,j /∈S2
1{z1,i =?, z2,j =?}
∏
i∈S1,j∈S2
UX(z1,i) UX(z2,i), (160)
where UX(z) is a uniform binary distribution when z = 0, 1, and UX(z) = 0 when z =?.
40
We thus have
I
(
Wc,Wd;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
= D
(
PWcWdZnS1ZSn2
∣∣∣∣PWcWdPZnS1ZSn2
)
(161)
=
∑
wc,wd
PWcWd(wc, wd)
∑
zn1 ,z
n
2
P
Zn
S1
Zn
S2
∣∣WcWd(zn1 , zn2 |wc, wd) log
(
PWcWdZnS1Z
n
S2
(wc, wd, z
n
1 , z
n
2 )
PZn
S1
Zn
S2
(zn1 , z
n
2 )PWcWd(wc, wd)
)
(162)
=
∑
wc,wd
PWcWd(wc, wd)
∑
zn1 ,z
n
2
P
Zn
S1
Zn
S2
∣∣WcWd(zn1 , zn2 |wc, wd)
× log

PZnS1ZnS2∣∣WcWd(zn1 , zn2 |wc, wd)
QZn
S1
Zn
S2
(zn1 , z
n
2)
×
QZn
S1
Zn
S2
(zn1 , z
n
2 )
PZn
S1
Zn
S2
(zn1 , z
n
2)

 (163)
=
∑
wc,wd
PWcWd(wc, wd)
[
D
(
P
Zn
S1
Zn
S2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd∣∣∣∣QZnS1ZnS2
)
− D
(
PZn
S1
Zn
S2
∣∣∣∣QZn
S1
Zn
S2
)]
(164)
≤
∑
wc,wd
PWcWd(wc, wd) D
(
P
Zn
S1
Zn
S2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd∣∣∣∣QZnS1ZnS2
)
. (165)
Define ZS1 , {ZS1,i : i ∈ S1}, Z
S2 , {ZS2,i : i ∈ S2}, Z
Sc1 , {ZS1,i : i /∈ S1}, Z
Sc2 , {ZS2,i :
i /∈ S2}, and let z
S1 , zS2 , zS
c
1 , zS
c
2 be the corresponding realizations. Note that ZnS1 = {Z
S1 ,ZS
c
1}
and ZnS2 = {Z
S2 ,ZS
c
2}. For each S1, S2, wc, and wd, we have
D
(
P
Zn
S1
Zn
S2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd∣∣∣∣QZnS1ZnS2
)
= D
(
P
ZS1Z
Sc1ZS2Z
Sc2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd∣∣∣∣QZS1ZSc1ZS2ZSc2
)
(166)
=
∑
zS1 ,zS
c
1 ,zS2 ,zS
c
2
P
ZS1Z
Sc
1ZS2Z
Sc
2
∣∣WcWd (zS1 , zSc1 , zS2, zSc2∣∣wc, wd)
× log

PZS1ZSc1ZS2ZSc2∣∣WcWd
(
z
S1 , zS
c
1 , zS2, zS
c
2 |wc, wd
)
Q
ZS1Z
Sc1ZS2Z
Sc2
(zS1 , zS
c
1 , zS2, zS
c
2)

 (167)
=
∑
zS1 ,zS
c
1 ,zS2 ,zS
c
2
P
ZS1ZS2
∣∣WcWd (zS1, zS2∣∣wc, wd)PZSc1ZSc2∣∣WcWdZS1ZS2 (zSc1 , zSc2∣∣wc, wd, zS1, zS2)
× log

PZS1ZS2∣∣WcWd
(
z
S1 , zS2
∣∣wc, wd)P
Z
Sc
1Z
Sc
2
∣∣WcWdZS1ZS2 (zSc1 , zSc2∣∣wc, wd, zS1, zS2)
QZS1ZS2 (z
S1 , zS2)Q
Z
Sc
1Z
Sc
2
∣∣
ZS1ZS2
(
zS
c
1 , zS
c
2
∣∣zS1 , zS2)


(168)
= D
(
P
ZS1ZS2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd∣∣∣∣QZS1ZS2
)
+
∑
zS1 ,zS2
P
ZS1ZS2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd (zS1, zS2)
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× D
(
P
Z
Sc
1Z
Sc
2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd,ZS1=zS1 ,ZS2=zS2 ∣∣∣∣QZSc1ZSc2 |ZS1=zS1 ,ZS2=zS2
)
(169)
= D
(
P
ZS1ZS2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd∣∣∣∣QZS1ZS2
)
, (170)
where (170) follows because
P
Z
Sc
1Z
Sc
2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd,ZS1=zS1 ,ZS2=zS2 = QZSc1ZSc2∣∣ZS1=zS1 ,ZS2=zS2
=
∏
i/∈S1,j /∈S2
1{z1,i =?, z2,j =?}. (171)
By applying the stronger version of Wyner’s soft covering lemma in [38, Lemma 1] to (170),
for every ǫ > 0, there exists a γ(ǫ) > 0 such that
PBwc,wd
(
D
(
P
Zn
S1
Zn
S2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd∣∣∣∣QZnS1ZnS2
)
> ǫ
)
= PBwc,wd
(
D
(
P
ZS1ZS2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd∣∣∣∣QZS1ZS2
)
> ǫ
)
≤ exp
(
−enγ(ǫ)
)
, (172)
since the rate of Bwc,wd is slightly greater than α, i.e., Bwc,wd contains 2
nαǫ codewords.
Using (165) and (170), we have
I
(
Wc,Wd;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
≤
∑
wc,wd
PWcWd(wc, wd) D
(
P
ZS1ZS2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd∣∣∣∣QZS1ZS2
)
. (173)
Thus,
PBwc,wd

 max
S1,S2⊆[1:n]:
|S1|+|S2|=µ
I
(
Wc,Wd;Z
n
S1 ,Z
n
S2
)
≥ ǫ


≤ PBwc,wd
(
max
S1,S2
∑
wc,wd
PWcWd(wc, wd) D
(
P
ZS1ZS2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd∣∣∣∣QZS1ZS2
)
> ǫ
)
(174)
≤ PBwc,wd
(
max
wc,wd
S1,S2
D
(
P
ZS1ZS2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd∣∣∣∣QZS1ZS2
)
> ǫ
)
(175)
= PBwc,wd

 ⋃
wc,wd
S1,S2
D
(
P
ZS1ZS2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd∣∣∣∣QZS1ZS2
)
> ǫ

 (176)
≤
∑
wc,wd
S1,S2
PBwc,wd
(
D
(
P
ZS1ZS2
∣∣Wc=wc,Wd=wd∣∣∣∣QZS1ZS2
)
> ǫ
)
(177)
where (174) follows from (173), and (177) follows from the union bound. Since the combined
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number of the messages wc, wd, and the subsets S1, S2 is at most exponential in n, using the
super-exponential decay rate in (172), the probability term on the right hand side of (174) goes to
zero as n goes to infinity. Thus, maxS1,S2 I
(
Wc,Wd;Z
n
S1
,ZnS2
)
converges to zero almost surely.
This completes the proof of (43).
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